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ABSTRACT
ROLE OF RISK AVERSION IN COUNTRIES’ PORTFOLIO CHOICES
O¨ZCAN, Fulya
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Selin Sayek Bo¨ke
July 2012
This study aims to investigate the role of endogenously changing risk aversion
in the portfolio decisions of the countries in a heterogeneous agents setting. Data
shows that developed countries tend to hold more risky assets whereas developing
countries hold more risk-free assets. This suggests developed countries to be less
risk averse compared to the developing countries. This paper analyzes the role of
risk aversion, which changes endogenously depending on the growth rate devia-
tions from the expected growth rate, in the asset demands of countries. Therefore
this paper seeks to answer how the asset demands change as the developed coun-
tries become more risk averse. In this study, developed countries are assumed to
be less risk averse; however, their coefficient of risk aversion increases when their
future endowments fall below their expectations, which is an exogenous factor
affecting the demand for the assets of the developing countries.
Keywords: Asset Choice, Portfolio Compositions, Endogenous Risk Aversion
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O¨ZET
RI˙SKTEN KAC¸INMANIN U¨LKELERI˙N PORTFO¨Y SEC¸I˙MLERI˙
U¨ZERI˙NDEKI˙ ROLU¨
O¨ZCAN, Fulya
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Doc¸. Dr. Selin Sayek Bo¨ke
Temmuz 2012
Bu c¸alıs¸ma, heterojen ajanlar kullanarak, endojen olarak deg˘is¸en riskten kac¸ın-
ma katsayısının u¨lkelerin portfo¨y kararlarındaki rolu¨nu¨ aras¸tırmaktır. Verilere
go¨re, gelis¸mekte olan u¨lkeler risksiz varlıklar tutmaktayken, gelis¸mis¸ u¨lkelerin
portfo¨ylerinde riskli varlıklar daha c¸ok yer kaplamaktadır. U¨lkelerin finansal
varlık sec¸imlerinde bu s¸ekilde farklılas¸mıs¸ olması, gelis¸mis¸ u¨lkelerin gelis¸mekte
olan u¨lkelere kıyasla riskten daha az kac¸ındıg˘nı go¨stermektedir. Bu c¸alıs¸mada,
gelis¸mis¸ u¨lkelerin riskten daha az kac¸ındıg˘ı varsayılmaktadır; ancak, riskten kac¸ın-
ma katsayısı onların gelecekteki bu¨yu¨me beklentilerine go¨re deg˘is¸mektedir; bu¨yu¨-
me oranı beklentilerin altında gerc¸ekles¸tig˘i takdirde, riskten kac¸ınma katsayıları
artmaktadır. Riskten kac¸ınma katsayısı, gelis¸mekte olan u¨lkelerin varlıklarına
olan talebi etkileyen dıs¸sal bir fakto¨rdu¨r. Bu sebeple, bu c¸alıs¸mada ic¸sel fakto¨rlerin
yanısıra yabancıların riskten kac¸ınmasının deg˘is¸mesi gibi dıs¸sal fakto¨rlerin gelis¸-
mekte olan u¨lkelelerin varlıklarına olan talebi nasıl deg˘is¸tireceg˘i incelenmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Varlık Sec¸imi, Portfo¨y Kompozisyonları, Endojen
Deg˘is¸en Riskten Kac¸ınma
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates how the portfolio choices and hence the external bal-
ances of the countries change as a result of changes in risk aversion. Global im-
balances have been raising a lot of concern for the last decades, with the United
States being the leading contributor. The fact that the U.S. is running large
current account deficits and the periphery economies are financing that deficit by
running large current account surpluses has been worrying the policymakers. As
seen in Figure-1, the current account position of the U.S. worsens over years. This
pattern increases the concerns since the sustainability of external imbalances is
doubtful and their correction will require corrections in the exchange rates as well.
One of the main explanations for the global imbalances is the ‘savings glut
hypothesis’ put forward by Bernanke (2005), which suggests that the high sav-
ings propensity in ‘emerging economies’ and some industrialized countries (such
as Germany and Japan) has resulted in a rush to U.S. equities due to lack of
sufficient investment opportunities elsewhere. This even turned the net foreign
asset position of the U.S. into a deficit during the 1990’s and the first half of the
2000’s (See Figure-2).
It is not only the size or the sign of the external balances but also their com-
position that has been worrisome for the policymakers. In addition to its highly
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negative NFA position, the U.S. also has a critical portfolio composition: long in
risky or illiquid assets and short in safe or liquid assets, whereas holdings of the
rest of the world (investors of the U.S. securities) have the opposite composition
(Gourinchas and Rey, 2007a)). This implies that US has a smaller coefficient of
risk aversion compared to the rest of the world.
Risk aversion plays an important role in determining these patterns of foreign
asset holdings. One of the main proxies that are used for risk aversion is the
volatility perceptions of the investors; as the risk perception increases, this is re-
flected as higher volatility in the asset prices. Figure-4 plots VIX, Chicago Board
Figure 1: U.S. CA balance as a percentage of GDP - Source: World
Bank World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance
Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, for the last two decades. VIX shows
investors’ risk expectations for the next 30-day period. A change in VIX is caused
by a change in investors’ risk perception. Therefore as VIX increases, this implies
that the investors are perceiving the financial markets to be riskier, and when
2
the markets are perceived to be risky, investors shift from holding risky assets to
holding less risky assets. (See Figure-3 Thus, the risk aversion of the investors is
Figure 2: U.S. Net Foreign Asset as a ratio of GDP - Source: World
Bank World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance
not constant over time but rather changes depending on the market’s situation.
The search for investment opportunities as put forward by savings glut hypothesis
reveals itself as a very low volatility during the first half of the 2000’s, which is
then followed by a sudden spike during the global financial crisis. This is because
a low risk perception, which reveals itself in a low level of VIX, results in higher
asset demand whereas when people suddenly perceive more risk in the market -
as in the case of global financial crisis- VIX rises and demand for risky assets falls.
This risk panic is also reflected in the US net foreign asset holdings as a shift
from negative to positive position. Table-1 shows the US net securities flows be-
fore and during the global financial crisis. During these different phases, changes
in risk perception (as can be seen in VIX) affects not only the amount of the
3
securities but also the composition of the holdings. For instance, at the peak
of the crisis -Phase 2- (which also corresponds to the peak of the VIX at 2008),
foreign investors of the US securities shift their US holdings from risky to riskless
assets, i.e., they increase their holdings of treasury bonds and bills and decrease
their holdings of private assets to a great extent. This period is when the highest
amount of US official assets are held by the foreigners during crisis. This ‘safe
haven’ or ‘flight to quality’ affect can be considered as one of the consequences
of changes in risk aversion on portfolio holdings. This table therefore exemplifies
how changes in risk aversion affects the portfolio compositions.
Figure 3: Us Gross Long and Short Term External Debt Position -
Source: World Bank Quarterly External Debt Statistics
The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between changes in risk
aversion and portfolio compositions through factors affecting the developed (for-
eign) country.The effects of changes in mean returns or variance of returns of
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domestic assets on foreigners’ demand for domestic assets is trivial; as the do-
mestic asset yields increase, holding the variance constant, foreigners increase
their demand for domestic asset. In the case where the variance of the domestic
assets increase, holding the returns constant, domestic assets become riskier and
hence foreigners demand less of the domestic asset. These changes occur due
to factors endogenous to the domestic economy. However, there are also factors
exogenous to the developing country, but still affect the foreign demand for their
assets. For instance, a negative shock to the developed country may result in
Figure 4: VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index
- Source: Daily data from CBOE, annual average: author’s calculation
the residents of the developed country turning more risk averse than usual and
therefore they end up reducing the share of the domestic asset in their portfo-
lios, regardless of the situation in the domestic country. Thus, in this paper,
developed country is assumed to be less risk averse and therefore holds more
risky assets compared to the developing country. Moreover, since the developed
country has a more stable economy than the developing, a negative shock to the
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fundamentals in the developed country has a greater impact on the economy,
which results in foreigners becoming more risk averse. To relate the patterns
observed in the external balances to the changes in the risk aversion, this pa-
per develops an asymmetric open economy DSGE model of two countries, where
foreigners, who are originally less risk averse, become more risk averse and even-
tually change their portfolio compositions. Modelling the effects of the factors
exogenous to an economy on the foreign demand for their assets and hence on
countries’ portfolio compositions is the contribution of this paper to the literature.
This paper is organized as follows: Section-II elaborates more on the literature
about global imbalances and risk aversion. In Section-III a DSGE model of two
countries with heterogeneous countries is developed. In Section-IV a simplified
version of this model is solved, obtaining a closed form solution. In Section-V
using data for developing countries and the US, different cases that change the
countries’ portfolio compositions are analyzed and Section-VI does a robustness
check. Section VII concludes.
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Pre-Crisis Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
2006- Q3 2007- Q3 2008- Q1 2009-
Q2 2007 Q2 2008 Q4 2008 Q2 2009
Securities, total 368.8 -36.0 358.4 -244.6
by private investors
Foreign purchases 765.0 189.9 60.0 12.7
of US securities
Treasury -19.7 73.2 323.1 62.0
Coupon securities -22.9 -10.3 49.9 73.5
Bills 2.1 83.5 273.0 -11.6
Agencies 20.9 -107.4 -183.0 -98.8
Corporate bonds 572.8 82.5 -78.5 -34.3
Equities 191.0 141.6 -1.6 83.8
US purchases of -396.1 -225.9 298.4 -257.2
foreign securities
Bonds -247.7 -113.3 200.7 -179.1
Equities -148.5 -112.6 97.7 -78.1
Memo heightForegin official 494.7 614.3 199.1 391.8
assets in the US
of which: Treasury bonds 194.2 172.1 103.9 275.9
of which: Treasury bills -27.2 66.4 486.9 207.7
US official assets abroad 5.0 -62.1 -1,048.7 875.9
Table 1: Net securities flows in the US balance of payments (in billions
of US dollars, annual rate) - Source: McCauley and McGuire (2009) -
During the second phase of the crisis, which corresponds to the peak point of the VIX,
both foreign and U.S. investors shift from holding equities and stocks to holding treasury
bills and bonds. This suggests that as the volatility perception increases, investors turn
more risk averse and hence move towards holding less risky assets.
7
CHAPTER 2
RELATED LITERATURE
There are two major channels aiming to explain the current account adjust-
ments. The conventional theory is the intertemporal approach to the current
account (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995), where the current account deficits are sug-
gested to arise from expected current account surpluses and hence they imply
trade surpluses in the future. However, Gourinchas and Rey (2007b) argue that
this trade channel is insufficient to explain the current account dynamics as it
ignores the capital gains and losses on the external accounts; as a complementary
channel, they propose the valuation channel where the adjustment takes place
through expectations in foreign portfolio returns. In this study, external balance
adjustments happen due to the deviations from the expected endowments, which
affect risk aversion. Since risk aversion changes, consequently the portfolio com-
positions will be affected.
Changes in risk aversion due to endowment shocks in this paper leads the
foreign country to require higher returns from the domestic assets, which will be
endogenously solved in the model. Therefore there will be an endogenous risk
premium for the assets of the developing country. Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
models the interest rate of an emerging economy as a function of the world inter-
est rate for risky assets and a country risk where they analyze the role of interest
rate fluctuations in determining the output volatility in emerging markets. In
their paper, the world interest rate can change due to external factors, whereas
there are two sources for the country risk. The country risk can change either
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due to external factors (which change the world interest rate without affecting
the default risk) or due to fundamentals (which directly affect the default risk).
The external factors that they consider are foreign events, contagion or political
factors that are independent of the fundamentals of the domestic country. Funda-
mentals directly affect the default risk as they model the default risk component
as a decreasing function of expected productivity. Therefore both changes in the
world interest rate and the country’s endogenous default risk change the interest
rate that country faces. In this paper, risk premium is related to what they refer
to as the “foreign events”. As foreigners become more risk averse due to their
own endowment shocks, they require more premium from the domestic country
regardless of the economic conditions of the domestic country. Since this paper
incorporates the risk aversion factor into risk premium endogenously, it can be
considered as an improvement in the risk premium as risk premium should also
capture the changes in risk aversion.
In the general model developed in this paper, risk aversion of the country de-
pends on the realization of their expected future endowments. If their endowment
next period is at least as much as their expectation, their risk taking behavior
does not change. However since they are not used to negative endowment shocks,
once their endowment next period falls below the expected level, they become
more risk averse and hence require more return from the assets of the developing
country. The negative deviation from the future expectations is incorporated into
the foreigner’s utility, which is one source of heterogeneity in the model. This
formulation of utility is related but not exactly similar to the habit formation
models 1. These models look at the deviations from the past consumption levels
(habit). Agents in those models try to improve their consumption levels upon
their consumption history. However in this model, agents (foreigners) get disu-
tility once their endowment falls below what they had expected instead of their
1See Ferson and Constantinides (1991), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Ravn et. al. (2006),
Verdelhan (2010), for the habit formation models where agents get lower utility as their con-
sumption reduces closer to the habit or subsistence level of consumption. In Borri and Verdelhan
(2011), sovereign defaults and bond prices are shown to be depending not only on the economic
conditions of the borrower but also on the time-varying risk aversion of the lenders, using
external habit preferences for the lenders only.
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habit level. This deviation factor in the utility also changes the risk aversion.
Since deviation factor is forward-looking, it is another contribution of this paper.
Another source of heterogeneity in this model is that, foreign country is as-
sumed to be less risk averse than the domestic country. This follows from the
differences in the portfolio compositions observed in the data. Arslan et. al.
(2012) and Gourinchas et. al. (2011a) analyze the portfolio compositions with
the ex-ante assumption that the developed countries are less risk averse, and
show that both risk premia and portfolio composition can be explained with this
difference. However in those papers coefficients of risk aversion do not change as
a result of shocks. Guvenen (2009) sets up a model where heterogeneous pref-
erences are caused by the differences in intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
using Epstein-Zin preferences which disentangles elasticity of substitution from
risk aversion. Again, in that paper risk aversion does not change with endowment
shocks.
The changes in size and the composition of external balances are analyzed
in two directions in the literature. One strand does the analysis in the demand
side of the financial markets, whereas the other analyzes the effect of the asset
supplies. The major demand side explanations used in this paper are Mendoza
(2009), Mendoza and Quadrini (2009), Kraay and Ventura (1999), Kraay et. al
(2005) and Tille and van Wincoop (2009). This study closely follows that of
Mendoza et. al. (2009), where the global imbalances are suggested to arise from
financial integration of economies with different levels of financial market devel-
opments. They assert that these differences also effect the portfolio compositions
where financially developed countries end up having a negative net foreign asset
position with positive net holdings of risky assets. They set up a DSGE model
with incomplete financial markets with shocks to endowment and investment.
Their model explains the current patterns and compositions of the foreign asset
portfolios. In this study, however, changes in foreigners’ risk aversion will be in-
corporated into the context of heterogeneous endowment processes with a DSGE
model to analyze the effects on the composition of external balances as well as
their magnitude.
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Mendoza and Quadrini (2009), observing the fact that the financial crises in
emerging economies having arisen from not only the fundamentals and having
spread to many more countries coincided with a “widening period” of global im-
balances, analyze the relationship between global financial crisis and financial
globalization. In their paper the central role is played by the financial inter-
mediaries, whose net worth is hit by the credit shocks and the heterogeneity of
financial markets results in different reactions in portfolio compositions. Their
model explains the movements observed in asset holdings prior to global financial
crisis and finds that the global contagion and large changes in asset prices can be
attributed to the shocks to financial intermediaries. Kraay and Ventura (1999)
find that when there is high investment risk compared to diminishing returns to
domestic assets, countries have an incentive not to change their foreign to do-
mestic asset compositions in their portfolios whereas when investment risk is low
compared to diminishing returns to domestic assets, transitory income shock is
always reflected as an investment in the foreign assets. Kraay et. al. (2005)
show that size and composition of external balances depend on diminishing re-
turns, production risk and sovereign risk. In a more extended model, Tille and
van Wincoop (2009) using a two country DSGE analysis with incomplete finan-
cial markets and show that there are three main factors that drive capital flows:
portfolio growth, portfolio reallocation associated with time-varying expected re-
turns and risk, and portfolio reallocation associated with time-varying second
moments. This paper will contribute to the literature as changes in risk aversion
is considered as a factor that changes the portfolio compositions, in addition to
the ones presented in the previous studies.
The two major studies with a supply side analysis where incomplete financial
markets with different levels of financial deepness are developed are Caballero et.
al. (2008a) and (2008b). Caballero et. al. (2008a) suggest that the heterogeneity
in financial developments across countries result in discrepancy in asset supplies,
and show that global imbalances as well as low interest rates are equilibrium
outcomes of this heterogeneity. In Caballero et. al. (2008b), the global financial
crisis is attributed to the burst of the asset bubble which was created by the
global asset scarcity that had led to a rush to U.S. securities.
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CHAPTER 3
GENERAL MODEL
This paper seeks to explore the consequences of a change in the risk aversion
of the developed country, caused by its own fundamentals, on the demand for the
developing country’s assets and the risk premium on those assets. Developed and
developing country differ from each other in terms of their risk aversion. Whereas
the risk aversion of investors in the developing country is constant at a high level,
risk aversion of the investors in the developed country is subject to change de-
pending on the performance of the economy. When the economy performs poorly
compared to the expectations, investors in the developed country change their
portfolio compositions and/ ir they require a higher premium form the domestic
assets. This in turn affects the external balances of both countries.
This paper sets up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with het-
erogeneous countries. There are two countries in consideration: domestic and
foreign. Each country has a continuum of identical households and hence their
preferences admit a representative household. However, there is one representa-
tive agent in each country as they differ in their risk preferences. Domestic and
foreign interest rates differ from each other by the amount of the risk premium.
The risk premium for the domestic assets arises from the fact that domestic
country is less developed compared to foreign country. For the sake of simplicity,
countries are endowment economies with no production. Utility of the domestic
agents are not affected by the deviations in their endowments. However, once the
foreigners receive a lower endowment than they had expected, they turn more risk
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averse. Therefore, endowment fluctuations are incorporated into their utility. In-
vestors becoming more risk averse changes the interest rate through risk premium,
as they require higher return from the domestic assets. Consequently, expected
returns and hence asset demands also change, which then leads to adjustments
in the portfolio decisions. The adjustments in portfolio decisions can take form
in a magnitude change (positive or a negative portfolio growth) or a composition
change (allocation between foreign and domestic holdings, as well as allocation
between risky and safe assets). These changes eventually affect external balances.
This paper does not regard domestic country as a small open economy as
country size is not an issue here. Instead, the two countries differ from each other
in terms of their development levels. Investing in domestic economy is riskier
than in foreign economy as the domestic country is a developing country. For-
eign bonds on the other hand, are considered as risk-free assets, which earn the
risk free interest rate. This drives a wedge between foreign and domestic interest
rates. This wedge is the risk premium which is a function of the deviation from
the expected foreign endowment. In this sense, the interest that the foreign bonds
pay can be considered as the world interest rate. Given these, foreign economy
can be considered to represent U.S. whereas the domestic economy represents
the periphery countries as a whole, i.e., the financial counterparts of the U.S.
financial account imbalance.
3.1 Households
Throughout this paper, households are utility maximizers from consumption
of domestic and foreign goods only. The utility function depends on the risk aver-
sion of the households. Their income constraint depends on their endowments
and returns from asset holdings. Domestic and foreign agents trade with each
other, so they maximize their utility from the consumption of the both domestic
and foreign goods.
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3.1.1 Type of the Utility Function
Since the aim of this paper is to determine the effect on the portfolio choices
resulting from the changes in risk aversion depending on endowment shocks,
choosing the appropriate type of utility function is crucial for the analysis. The
two candidates are the usual CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility and
non-expected/ recursive utility. In CRRA utility, intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution and coefficient of relative risk aversion are reciprocals of each other.
Therefore, this requires an a priori belief that high risk aversion comes along
with low intertemporal elasticity of substitution2. Moreover, it may not be pos-
sible to determine the sole effect of changes in risk aversion if risk aversion is
related to thee intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
One alternative to overcome this problem is to use Epstein and Zin prefer-
ences instead of CRRA utility (Epstein and Zin, 1989). By using recursive and
non-expected utility, authors are able to disentangle the sole effect of risk aversion
from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In order to conclude that this
class of utility functions are suitable for the portfolio choice analysis, it is impor-
tant to compare the asset choices using both non-expected recursive utility and
CRRA utility. One study that does so is that of Giuliano and Turnovsky (2003),
where authors show that using CRRA utility causes biased results in portfolio
weights3. However, their analysis is on choosing different parametric values for
risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution and comparing the re-
sults on portfolio choices. Since this is a parametric exercise on coefficient of risk
aversion, whose true value is almost impossible to determine, arguing that CRRA
brings about biased results might also be a biased conclusion.
The utility function that would suit the exercise in this paper should allow
the coefficient of relative risk aversion to increase as there is a negative endow-
ment shock. This idea leads to finding a “risk vulnerable” utility function. By
incorporating another risk (“background risk”) to an agent’s wealth, Gollier and
2See Hall (1988) and Weil (1990) for a separation between risk aversion and intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
3For more work in asset choice literature using non-expected recursive utility, see Obstfeld
(1994) and Bhamra and Uppal (2006).
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Pratt (1996) show that the agent becomes more risk averse for another indepen-
dently risky alternative. This paper would like to show that as foreigners receive
a negative endowment shock, their risk aversion for the domestic assets, which
has no correlation with their endowment process, increases; which is very similar
to the risk vulnerability idea. Gollier and Pratt (1996) determine the conditions
for a type of utility function to be risk vulnerable and find that CRRA utility
is among many other classes that are risk vulnerable. Therefore CRRA utility
would be sufficient for the analysis in this paper.
3.1.2 Domestic Households
Domestic agents consume both foreign and domestic goods. Two types of
goods are aggregated using a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility
function with CRRA preferences. The relevant utility function for the represen-
tative risk averse household for domestic country with a constant coefficient of
relative risk aversion is as follows:
U(cdt , ct∗d) =
[
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)(1−ηd)
](1−αd) − 1
1− αd (3.1)
(3.1)
The corresponding RRA coefficient:
φd = αd (3.2)
Total per capita consumption in period t equals:
ct = c
d
t + ct ∗d (3.3)
where cdt is the per capita domestic good consumption by domestic agents at
period t,ct∗d is the per capita foreign good consumption by domestic agents at
period t, and 1/αd is the coefficient of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for domestic country, and ηd is the constant elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods.
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3.1.3 Foreign Households
Foreign households are assumed to be less risk averse, and their utility depends
on the deviations of their endowments from their expectations, as well as their
consumption4. In modelling the utility function which incorporates deviations of
wealth, this paper adopts the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility function in
the following form, again using CES aggregation for both types of goods:
U(ct∗f , cft ) =
[
(ct ∗f −γt)ηf (cft )
(1−ηf )](1−αf ) − 1
1− αf (3.4)
The corresponding RRA coefficient:
φf = αf
(
ct
ct − γt
)
(3.5)
Total per capita consumption in period t equals:
ct∗ = ct ∗f +cft (3.6)
Here, γt is considered as a preference parameter that governs the relationship
between wealth level and RRA, and defined as a function of the deviations from
the expected endowment:
γt+1 = −1
2
{(y∗t+1 − Et[y∗t+1])− |y∗t+1 − Et[y∗t+1]|} (3.7)
There are two possible cases for γ. If foreigners receive at least as much en-
dowment as they had expected i.e., if y∗t+1 ≥ Et[y∗t+1], then γt+1 = 0; so the risk
aversion coefficient does not change. However, once they receive less endowment
i.e., y∗t+1 ≤ Et[y∗t+1], then γ becomes positive and hence foreigners turn more risk
averse.
4Borri and Verdelhan (2011) also introduces a heterogeneity between agents in terms of
their preferences. In their model borrowers have a CRRA utility with constant RRA whereas
lenders exhibit external habit preferences with CRRA utility, which results in lenders having a
varying risk aversion coefficient.
16
3.2 Endowment
The sources of income of the household depends on the type of the economy. In
the endowment economy, households receive stochastic endowments each period
and due to this uncertainty, they buy foreign and domestic bonds.
Assume that domestic and foreign economy are endowed with income yt
and y∗t respectively. Since domestic economy represents the surplus countries as
a whole, evolution of yt is chosen to be mean-reverting at the level, whereas for
the foreign economy this process is mean-reverting at the growth rate and hence
endowment process is explosive so that foreign economy runs CA deficits5. These
processes are chosen in order to mimic the patterns observed in the data. The
country that runs the CA deficits represents the developed country, which in fact
represents the U.S., whereas the country that runs CA surplus is a representative
developing country. The path yt follows therefore is given by:
(yt+1 − y¯) = ρd(yt − y¯) + ut+1 (3.8)
The path for yt∗ follows therefore is given by:
(y∗t+1 − y∗t ) = ρf (y∗t − y∗t−1) + vt+1 (3.9)
where u and v are white noise processes and 0 < ρd < 1 and 0 < ρf < 1 so that
the process itself is not explosive.
Then, the budget constraint for the domestic representative household is given
by:
At+1 + St+1 + Ct −RstSt −R∗tAt = yt (3.10)
For the foreign household:
A∗t+1 + S
∗
t+1 + C
∗
t −RstS∗t −R∗tA∗t = y∗t (3.11)
where
• At : one period risk-free bonds issued by foreign country and held by do-
mestic country
5This follows from Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
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• St : one period risky bonds issued by domestic country and held by domestic
country
• Ct : total consumption of domestic household in period t
• R∗t : gross return on foreign assets in period t, (R∗t+1 is known today)
• Rst : gross return on domestic assets in period t
• A∗t : one period risk-free bonds issued by foreign country and held by foreign
country
• S∗t : one period risky bonds issued by domestic country and held by foreign
country
• C∗t : total consumption of foreign household in period t
In Neumeyer and Perri (2005), it is assumed that the US interest rate follows an
AR(1) process. In their study, they use real yield on an index on non-investment
grade domestic bonds and find the AR(1) coefficient. In this paper, it is also
assumed that the risk-free interest rate follows an AR(1) process.However, shocks
to interest rate at time t happen one period ahead so that the interest rate next
period is known with certainty ie., Et[R
∗
t+1] = R
∗
t+1:
R∗t = ρrR
∗
t−1 + wt−1 (3.12)
The relation between risk-free and risky rate is as follows:
Rst = θt +R
∗
t (3.13)
where θ is the risk premium which will be explained in more detail in the follow-
ing section.
3.3 Risk Premium
Risk premium for the domestic assets has two components; domestic and
foreign. Domestic risk premium component, θdt is a function of the domestic
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endowment whereas foreign risk premium component θft depends not only on the
foreign endowment but also on the deviation form the expected endowment, γt.
Thus, the relationship between risk-free and risky rates can be separated in the
following form:
Rst+1 = R
∗
t+1 + θ
d
t+1 + θ
f
t+1 (3.14)
where θt = θ
d
t + θ
f
t
At time t, the domestic premium for the next period, θdt+1 is known by the
domestic agents, but this information is not available to the foreigners. This
can be considered as a one-period information lag between the two countries.
Therefore the expected return from the domestic assets for the domestic agents
is as follows:
Et[R
s
t+1]
d = R∗t+1 + θ
d
t+1 + Et[θ
f
t+1] (3.15)
In the similar manner, at time t, foreigners know how much the foreign pre-
mium, θft+1 will be next period, but domestic agents do not know this. Then,
expected return from the domestic assets for the foreigners is as follows:
Et[R
s
t+1]
f = R∗t+1 + θ
f
t+1 + Et[θ
d
t+1] (3.16)
These premiums will be calculated endogenously from the optimization prob-
lems from the domestic and foreign households.
3.4 External Balances
Financial account in both economies is defined as the differences in the changes
in domestic and foreign holdings of for both countries.
FAt = [S
∗
t − S∗t−1]− [At − At−1] (3.17)
FA∗t = [At − At−1]− [S∗t − S∗t−1] (3.18)
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3.5 Market Clearance Conditions
In each economy, endowment at time t is either consumed by the households
in that country or traded with the agents in the other country in return for assets
which are purchased by both residents and non-residents of that country. Thus,
the market clearance conditions are as follows:
yt = c
d
t + c
f
t (3.19)
y∗t = ct ∗f +ct ∗d (3.20)
3.6 First Order Conditions
In both countries, representative agents solve the same maximization prob-
lem with respect to the same constraint. Therefore for the beginning it suffices
to solve for the maximization problem of the domestic household to save from
notation:
max
∑∞
0 β
tU(cdt , c
∗
t
d) subject to (3.10)
Unconstrained Bellman: Representative domestic agent will choose how much
to allocate between risky and risk free bonds and to the domestic good. First the
agent allocates between assets given cdt and c
∗
t
d:
V (St, At; c
d
t , c
∗
t
d) = max
{St,At}
{U(cdt , yt +RstSt +R∗tAt − At+1 − St+1 − cdt )+
+ βEtV [St+1, At+1; c
d
t+1c
∗
t+1
d]} (3.21)
First Order Conditions:
St+1 : (1− ηd)
[
(cdt+1)
ηd(c∗t+1
d)
(1−ηd)
]−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd = βEt[VSt+1] (3.22)
At+1 : (1− ηd)
[
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)(1−ηd)
]−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd = βEt[VAt+1] (3.23)
Envelope Conditions:
St : VSt = R
s
t
(1−ηd)(1− ηd)
[
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)(1−ηd)
]−αd
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)−ηd (3.24)
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At : VAt = R
∗
t
(1−ηd)(1− ηd)
[
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)(1−ηd)
]−αd
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)−ηd (3.25)
Then the resulting first order conditions for the domestic household are as follows:
Iterating 3.24 and 3.25 one period, taking expectations and substituting back into
3.22 and 3.23 yield:
βEt
[
Rst+1
{
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)(1−ηd)
}−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd
]
=
{
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)(1−ηd)
}−αd
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)−ηd (3.26)
βEt
[
R∗t+1
{
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)(1−ηd)
}−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd
]
=
{
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)(1−ηd)
}−αd
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)−ηd (3.27)
Following the similar steps for the foreign household yields the following set
of equations:
βEt
[
Rst+1
{
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
(1−ηf )}−αf
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
−ηf
]
=
{
(ct ∗f −γt)ηf (cft )
(1−ηf )}−αf
(ct ∗f −γt)ηf (cft )
−ηf
(3.28)
βEt
[
R∗t+1
{
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
(1−ηf )}−αf
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
−ηf
]
=
{
(ct ∗f −γt)ηf (cft )
(1−ηf )}−αf
(ct ∗f −γt)ηf (cft )
−ηf
(3.29)
Equating the Euler Equations for the domestic agents:
βEt
[
Rst+1
{
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)(1−ηd)
}−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd
]
=
βEt
[
R∗t+1
{
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)(1−ηd)
}−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd
]
(3.30)
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Substituting 3.15 yields the domestic risk premium:
θdt+1 = −
Et
[
θft+1
{
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)(1−ηdf)
}−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd
]
Et
[{
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)(1−ηd)
}−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd
]
(3.31)
Following the similar steps for the foreigner and substituting 3.16 yields the
foreign risk premium:
θft+1 = −
Et
[
θdt+1
{
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
(1−ηf )}−αf
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
−ηf
]
Et
[{
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
(1−ηf )}−αf
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
−ηf
]
(3.32)
After choosing the asset holdings, agents decide how much to consume from
each type of good (domestic and foreign). Due to CES utility, the ratio of home
goods to imported goods are as follows:
cdt
ct∗d =
ηd
(1− ηd) (3.33)
(ct ∗f −γt)
cft
=
ηf
(1− ηf ) (3.34)
3.7 Euler Equations
Euler equations for domestic and foreign households are as follows:
βEt[R
∗
t+1]Et{
[(
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)(1−ηd)
)−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd
]
[(
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)(1−ηd)
)−αd
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)−ηd
] } = 1 (3.35)
22
βEt[R
∗
t+1]Et{
[(
(c∗t+1
f − γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
(1−ηf ))−αf
(c∗t+1
f − γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
−ηf
]
[(
(ct ∗f −γt)ηf (cft )
(1−ηf ))−αf
(ct ∗f −γt)ηf (cft )
−ηf
] } = 1
(3.36)
From Euler equations, consumption paths are also related as follows:
Et{
[(
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)(1−ηd)
)−αd
(cdt+1)
ηd(ct+1∗d)−ηd
]
[(
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)(1−ηd)
)−αd
(cdt )
ηd(ct∗d)−ηd
] } =
Et{
[(
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
(1−ηf ))−αf
(ct+1 ∗f −γt+1)ηf (cft+1)
−ηf
]
[(
(ct ∗f −γt)ηf (cft )
(1−ηf ))−αf
(ct ∗f −γt)ηf (cft )
−ηf
] } (3.37)
The model is summarized in Table-2
An analytical solution for this model could not be obtained due to time con-
straints. Therefore next chapter introduces a simplified version of this model with
parametric results.
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Table 2: Model Summary
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CHAPTER 4
SIMPLIFIED MODEL
In order to obtain a closed form solution for the analysis, this chapter
introduces a simplified version of the general model. The static model in this
chapter closely follows from Giuliano and Turnovsky (2003) where they develop
open economy models and analyze portfolio choices and their effects on growth6.
In this model, domestic representative agent maximizes a standard intertem-
poral recursive utility function given U(t) defined as:
f([1−φd]U(t)) =
(
1− φd
1− 1/(1− )
)
C(t)1−(1/)h+e−ρhf([1−φd]EtU(t+h)) (4.1)
where
• C(t) > 0 is period t consumption
• ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference
• φd > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion
•  > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
• h > 0 is the time interval (following Giuliano and Turnovsky (2003), h→ 0)
6Their methodology is closely related to the one in Svensson (1989) and their framework
follows from Obstfeld (1994).
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There are again two types of assets, domestic and foreign. There are no en-
dowments or any other sources of income other than the asset yields7. Hence,
the agent’s problem is to determine how much to allocate to consumption, and
to domestic and foreign assets.
Domestic asset has a stochastic rate of return Rd over the time interval
(t,t+dt):
dRd = rddt+ dd (4.2)
where dd is a Brownian motion with zero mean and σ2ddt variance. The same
process is also valid for the foreign asset with a Brownian motion process df
having a variance σ2fdt:
dRf = rfdt+ df (4.3)
The wealth constraint of the agent is then:
W = D + F (4.4)
where D denotes the domestic asset holdings and F denotes the foreign asset hold-
ings. Domestic agent maximizes the utility given in 4.1 subject to the stochastic
wealth accumulation equation choosing the portfolio shares of domestic and for-
eign assets ωd and ωf :
dW = W [ωddRd + ωfdRf ]− Cdt (4.5)
Then, the equilibrium conditions as in Giuliano and Turnovsky (2003) are:
ωd =
rd − rf
φd(σ2d + σ
2
f )
+
σ2f
(σ2d + σ
2
f )
(4.6)
ωf = 1− ωd (4.7)
g =
[(
1 + 
2φd
)
(rd − rf )2 + (rdσ2f + rfσ2d) + (1− )
φd
2
σ2fσ
2
d
]
1
(rdσ2f + rfσ
2
d)
− ρ
(4.8)
where g is the mean growth rate. For the agents residing in the foreign country,
the equilibrium conditions are symmetric:
ω∗f =
rf − rd
φf (σ2f + σ
2
d)
+
σ2d
(σ2f + σ
2
d)
(4.9)
7For models with other sources of income included, see Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and
Liu (2012).
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ω∗d = 1− ω∗f (4.10)
g∗ =
[(
1 + 
2φf
)
(rf − rd)2 + (rfσ2d + rdσ2f ) + (1− )
φf
2
σ2dσ
2
f
]
1
(rfσ2d + rdσ
2
f )
− ρ
(4.11)
What differs in this model from that of Giuliano and Turnovsky (2003) is
that here domestic and foreign countries have different coefficients of risk aver-
sion. Moreover, in order to obtain CRRA preferences, letting  = 1/φ for both
countries, growth rates are obtained as:
g =
[(
1 + 1/φd
2φd
)
(rd − rf )2 + 1
φd
(rdσ
2
f + rfσ
2
d) + (1−
1
φd
)
φd
2
σ2fσ
2
d
]
1
(rdσ2f + rfσ
2
d)
− ρ
φd
(4.12)
g∗ =
[(
1 + 1/φf
2φf
)
(rf − rd)2 + 1
φf
(rfσ
2
d + rdσ
2
f ) + (1−
1
φf
)
φf
2
σ2dσ
2
f
]
1
(rfσ2d + rdσ
2
f )
− ρ
φf
(4.13)
The capital accounts for both domestic and foreign countries are obtained by
the following equations:
KAd =M ω∗d− M ωf (4.14)
KAf =M ωf− M ω∗d (4.15)
Heterogeneity between the two countries comes from their coefficients of rela-
tive risk aversion. It is assumed that the domestic agents have a constant RRA,
i.e., φd = φd.However, foreign agents are assumed be more risk averse while their
risk aversion changes with the deviations from their mean growth rate expecta-
tions. In order to make sure that such relation exists, VIX is regressed on the
US growth rate for the period 1990-2010 (See Figure-5). This regression reveals a
negative relationship, very close to unity, between growth rate and the volatility
perceptions of the agents. Since this relationship implies that as the economy
experiences a lower growth rate the volatility increases; in this model growth rate
is considered as a factor that affects risk aversion. For the purpose of explaining
the effects of the external factors on portfolio choices, this paper only consid-
ers negative shocks to growth rate, which makes a less risk averse agent become
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more risk averse, and eventually change his/her portfolio choice. Next chapter
calibrates the coefficients of risk aversion for domestic and foreign country given
the portfolio weights and then analyzes the how a negative growth shock changes
these weights and hence the external balances.
Figure 5: VIX yearly averaged close values and US growth rate. Source:
CBOE, World Bank - Investors perceive the financial markets to be riskier
when the growth rate is low; whereas as growth rate increases, investors per-
ceive a lower volatility. -
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CHAPTER 5
CALIBRATION
Domestic country in this model represents the developing countries whereas
foreign country refers to the US. Country size or population rates are neglected
as the concern is to determine the sole effect of a change in risk aversion of the
less risk averse country on the external balances. Throughout this exercise, the
rate of time reference, ρ equals 0.04.
From Gourinchas and Rey (2011a), the ratio of net foreign asset position to
gross domestic product for the US is taken and averaged for the period 1990-2010,
and is found to be -0.15, which leads to the following equality:
NFAf = ω
∗
d − ωf = −0.15 (5.1)
Since NFAd = −NFAf and that ωd + ωf = ω∗d + ω∗f = 1, total demands for
domestic and foreign assets are obtained to be respectively:
ωd + ω
∗
d = 0.85 (5.2)
ωf + ω
∗
f = 1.15 (5.3)
Next, from World Bank World Data Bank database, mean returns and vari-
ance of returns for US and a set of developing countries are obtained for the
period 1990-2010, using the real interest rate variable. These countries are cho-
sen as in Mendoza et. al. (2009) and are listed as: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Is-
rael, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
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Russia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. The values
obtained are: rd = 0.0821, rf = 0.0437, σ
2
d = 0.0065, and σ
2
f = 0.000377. From
the External Wealth of Nations-II data set of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), do-
mestic to foreign holdings ratio of the developing countries listed above and the
US are calculated and from these the portfolio weights are found as: ωd = 0.318
(domestic holdings of the domestic country), ωf = 0.682 (foreign holdings of the
domestic country), ω∗f = 0.3737 (foreign holdings of the foreign country), and
ω∗d = 0.6268 (domestic holdings of the foreign country). With these values at
hand, the coefficient of risk aversion for the domestic and foreign countries can
be calibrated. This calibration exercise proves that the residents of the US are
less risk averse compared to the ones in the developing countries since φd = 21.23
and φf = 9.77. However, the reader should note that these portfolio values are
initial values for the exercise in this chapter and are used to calibrate the risk
aversion coefficients (See Table-3). Domestic representative agent have a con-
stant coefficient of relative risk aversion, whereas the RRA found for the foreign
representative agent is only the staring value for the analysis and is not constant.
The following step is to find a relationship between the foreign growth rate
and foreigners’ risk aversion. For that, a relationship similar to the one in 3.7 is
obtained:
φf = φf + γ (5.4)
where φf = 9.77 is the initial value of RRA for the foreign agent, γ is the prefer-
ence parameter:
γ = δ
1
2
{(g∗ − g∗)− |g∗ − g∗|} (5.5)
where g∗ = 0.4% is the initial and hence the expected mean growth rate for the
foreign economy. If the economy experiences a growth rate higher than g∗, risk
aversion stays constant at φf as γ = 0. However, if the growth rate is lower than
the initial level, then γ becomes positive and φf increases by the magnitude of γ,
which also depends on δ.
The idea of incorporating the deviations from the mean growth rate of wealth
in Equation 5.5 follows from the observation that as agents experience a reduc-
tion in their wealth, they become more risk averse and hence decrease the weight
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Variables Domestic Foreign
Coefficient of relative risk aversion 21.23 9.77
Weight of domestic asset 0.318 0.6268
Weight of foreign asset 0.682 0.3737
Mean growth rate 0.24 0.4
Table 3: Initial Values
of the risky domestic asset in their portfolios8. What is critical in this analysis
is finding a plausible value for δ. In order to do that, firstly one needs to find
how changes in growth rate affect the portfolio allocations. For that, data from
Calvet et. al. (2009) is taken and the relationship between the changes in wealth
and portfolio shares of risky and riskless assets is estimated. According to this
regression, as wealth increases by 1 unit, agents decrease the share of riskless
asset by 0.7297 units. Supposing that the wealth the representative foreign agent
declines by 0.01, the new portfolio weights become: ωf∗ = 0.381 and ωd∗ = 0.612.
The coefficient of risk aversion that implies these new weight is φf = 9.9. Thus a
0.01 units decline in wealth causes the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the
foreigner to increase by 0.13 units. This exercise is repeated for various changes
in wealth and the results are reported at Table 4. With these data, γ values are
regressed on the wealth changes and the coefficient from this regression is found
as -15.59. Using this value, δ is set to be δ = −15.59.
Once δ is also calibrated, it is able to proceed to study the countries’ portfolio
decisions. The remainder of this chapter analyzes different cases that affect the
portfolio choices of the representative agents of the countries.
8With a questionnaire survey data on the clients of a brokerage firm, Cohn et. al. (1975)
show that as wealth of the investors increase, their portfolio shares on risky assets also increase.
Using data from the Swedish households, Calvet et. al. (2009) show that as the wealth of
the households decrease, they allocate a lower share of their wealth to risky assets. Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) find risk aversion to be countercyclical using a habit formation model.
However, micro-studies by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and Chiappori and Paiella (2008)
find risk aversion to be constant with respect to changes in wealth.
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5.1 Yield on Domestic Asset Falls by Half
When the yield on the domestic asset falls by half, i.e., rd = 0.04105 < rf ,
demand for the domestic asset by both the domestic and the foreign agent falls
while the demand for the foreign asset increases: ωd = 0.0368, ωf = 0.963,
ω∗f = 0.985 and ω
∗
d = 0.015. Notice that both countries still hold a little portion
of their wealth in the risky domestic asset although it has a lower return compared
to the foreign asset, which is also less risky. This arises from the hedging behavior
of the representative agents, which is given from Equation-4.6 by σ2j (σ
2
i +σ
2
j ) for
the agent in country i. This relative ratio of the variances in the portfolio weights
determines how the agents diversify their portfolio whereas (ri − rj)/φi(σ2i + σ2f )
is the speculative behavior9.
The change in the capital accounts are: M KAd = −0.892 and M KAf = 0.892,
that is, the external position of the domestic country worsens while it improves
for the foreign country. This is caused by a factor endogenous to the domestic
economy, which supports the trivial argument that the conditions in an economy
affects the foreign demand for its assets.
5.2 Growth Rate Reduces by Half
In addition to the factors endogenous to an economy,some external factors
might also affect the demand for the assets of that country. If, for instance,
the growth rate is observed at 0.2 % instead of 0.4%, it is obtained that γ =
3.118. Then the coefficient of risk aversion increases to φf = 12.888. Keeping
the mean and variance of returns constant, this causes foreigners to increase the
weight of their own assets in their portfolios while decreasing the weight of the
domestic country’s asset: ωf∗ = 0.512, ω∗d = 0.488. The the total demand for
domestic assets falls as ωd +ω
∗
d = 0.8065, and demand for foreign assets increases
as ωf + ω
∗
f = 1.194. Then the change in the capital accounts are given as:
M KAd = −0.1388 and M KAf = 0.1388, that is, when foreign agents become
more risk averse due to a negative growth shock, they reduce their demand for
the risky domestic asset and hence improve their external position. However, due
9See Giuliano and Turnovsky (2003) for the discussion of the speculative and hedging be-
havior.
32
to this exogenous change, the demand for the domestic assets falling worsens the
domestic capital account although the mean returns and variances are unchanged.
This example shows how the external factors, such as changes in risk aversion of
the foreigners, affects the demand for the assets of the country in consideration
and hence its capital account.
5.3 Foreigners Asking for Higher Premium
The last case analyzed in this chapter is foreigners asking for higher risk
premium from the domestic assets after experiencing a lower growth rate than
they had expected. Following from Section 5.2, suppose that the growth rate is
observed at 0.2 % and consequently the coefficient of risk aversion of foreigners
increases to φf = 12.888. In order for foreigners to continue holding the same
portion of their wealth on the domestic asset, i.e., ω∗d = 0.6268, they require
higher return from the domestic asset. Keeping everything else constant, the
return on the domestic asset should increase to rd = 0.0943, with a risk premium
of θ = 0.0122. With this increase, domestic agents adjust their portfolio choices
accordingly and hence allocate wd = 0.402 of their wealth to their own assets.
The resulting change in the capital accounts are: M KAd = 0.084 and M KAf =
−0.084, which shows that as the premium on the domestic assets increase holding
the variance constant, total demand for the domestic asset increases and hence
the external balance of the domestic country is improved. This is another example
that shows how the changes in growth rate of the foreign country results in higher
risk premium for the domestic assets and hence changes the portfolio allocations.
The results of this chapter is summarized at Table- 5.
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M Wf ω∗f M ω∗f φf γ
-0.01 0.381176 0.007476 9.900301949 0.130301949
-0.015 0.3848245 0.0111245 9.964763377 0.194763377
-0.02 0.388473 0.014773 10.03006973 0.260069732
-0.025 0.3921215 0.0184215 10.09623773 0.326237733
-0.03 0.39577 0.02207 10.16328455 0.393284548
-0.035 0.3994185 0.0257185 10.2312278 0.4612278
-0.04 0.403067 0.029367 10.30008559 0.530085591
-0.045 0.4067155 0.0330155 10.36987651 0.59987651
-0.05 0.410364 0.036664 10.44061965 0.670619654
-0.055 0.4140125 0.0403125 10.51233464 0.742334645
-0.06 0.417661 0.043961 10.58504165 0.815041648
-0.065 0.4213095 0.0476095 10.65876139 0.88876139
-0.07 0.424958 0.051258 10.73351518 0.963515179
-0.075 0.4286065 0.0549065 10.80932493 1.039324925
-0.08 0.432255 0.058555 10.88621316 1.116213162
-0.085 0.4359035 0.0622035 10.96420307 1.194203069
-0.09 0.439552 0.065852 11.04331849 1.273318494
-0.095 0.4432005 0.0695005 11.12358398 1.353583978
-0.1 0.446849 0.073149 11.20502478 1.435024783
-0.105 0.4504975 0.0767975 11.28766691 1.517666913
-0.11 0.454146 0.080446 11.37153715 1.601537147
-0.115 0.4577945 0.0840945 11.45666307 1.686663066
-0.12 0.461443 0.087743 11.54307308 1.773073081
-0.125 0.4650915 0.0913915 11.63079647 1.860796469
-0.13 0.46874 0.09504 11.7198634 1.949863403
-0.135 0.4723885 0.0986885 11.81030499 2.040304987
-0.14 0.476037 0.102337 11.90215329 2.132153293
-0.145 0.4796855 0.1059855 11.9954414 2.225441397
-0.15 0.483334 0.109634 12.09020342 2.320203423
Table 4: Values for γ- In order to find a relationship between wealth changes and the
preference parameter γ, firstly, the portfolio shares to foreign asset by the foreigner is cal-
culated for every 0.5% reduction in the wealth. Then from equation 4.6, the corresponding
value for the φf is calculated. With the values of φf and wealth changes, using equation
5.5, γ values for each level of wealth is calculated, which finally helps to estimated the
other preference parameter, δ. Throughout this exercise, returns and variances are taken
at their initial levels.
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Initial Case Case-I Case-II Case-III
rd = 0.0821 rd = 0.04105 rd = 0.0821 rd = 0.0943
rf = 0.0437 rf = 0.0437 rf = 0.0437 rf = 0.0437
σ2d = 0.0065 σ
2
d = 0.0065 σ
2
d = 0.0065 σ
2
d = 0.0065
σ2f = 0.000377 σ
2
f = 0.000377 σ
2
f = 0.000377 σ
2
f = 0.000377
γ = 0 γ = 0 γ = 3.118 γ = 3.118
φd 21.23 21.23 21.23 21.23
φf 9.77 9.77 12.888 12.888
ωd 0.318 0.0368 0.318 0.402
ω∗d 0.6268 0.015 0.488 0.6268
ωf 0.682 0.963 0.682 0.598
ω∗f 0.3737 0.985 0.512 0.3737
M KAd 0 -0.892 -0.1388 0.084
M KAf 0 0.892 0.1388 -0.084
Table 5: Results Summary- The values in the initial case come directly from data.
Case-I is when the return on domestic assets fall by half, holding other things constant,
which results in a reduction in the demand for domestic assets and hence worsens the
capital account of the domestic country. Case-II is when the growth rate in the foreign
country is realized as half of the expectation, and hence foreigners become more risk averse,
shifting their risky domestic holdings to less risky foreign assets, which again worsens the
capital account of the domestic country as the total demand for the domestic assets fall. In
Case-III, when the foreigners become more risk averse due to the deviation of their growth
rate from their expectation, instead of decreasing their risky domestic holdings, they ask
for a higher premium for keeping the same portion of their wealth in the domestic asset,
which increases the total demand for the domestic asset since the return is increased and
hence improves the capital account of the domestic country.
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CHAPTER 6
ROBUSTNESS CHECK
This chapter provides a robustness check by analyzing the three cases in
Chapter-5 by modifying the preference parameter, γ. Referring back to Figure
4.1, it can also be argued that the foreigners not only become more risk averse
when the growth rate is lower but they also become less risk averse when the
growth rate is higher, since VIX and growth rate seem to be almost perfectly
negatively correlated. Thus, this chapter takes the relationship between growth
rate deviation and preference parameter γ symmetric and modifies equation 5.5
by dropping the absolute value terms. So, the new γ becomes:
γ = δ(g∗ − g∗) (6.1)
When γ is allowed to change symmetrically with respect to deviations from
the expected growth rate, δ is estimated as -12.74, using the same technique
as in the previous chapter. With these new preference parameters, this chapter
analyzes the three cases again, and also introduces further cases.
6.1 Yield on Domestic Asset Falls by Half
The results of this case does not change since the fall in the yield of the
domestic asset does not affect foreigners’ risk aversion. So, when the yield on
the domestic asset falls by half, i.e., rd = 0.04105 < rf , again the demand for
the domestic asset by both the domestic and the foreign agent falls while the
demand for the foreign asset increases: ωd = 0.0368, ωf = 0.963, ω
∗
f = 0.985
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and ω∗d = 0.015. The external position of the domestic country again worsens as
M KAd = −0.892 and M KAf = 0.892.
6.2 Growth Rate Reduces by Half
Since δ is changed when the coefficient of relative risk aversion responds to the
deviations from the expected growth rate symmetrically, the result of this case
is different from the one in the previous chapter. If the growth rate is observed
at 0.2 % instead of 0.4%, γ becomes 2.55 (it used to be 3.118 in the previous
chapter). Then the coefficient of risk aversion increases to φf = 12.32. With this
new value of φf , portfolio allocations are updated as: ωf∗ = 0.492, ω∗d = 0.508.
Then the change in the capital accounts are given as: M KAd = −0.1183 and
M KAf = 0.1183, which are lower than the values in the previous chapter.
6.3 Foreigners Asking for Higher Premium
Following from the previous section, suppose that the growth rate is observed
at 0.2 % and consequently the coefficient of risk aversion of foreigners increases
to φf = 12.32. In order for foreigners to continue holding the same portion of
their wealth on the domestic asset, i.e., ω∗d = 0.6268, the return on the domestic
asset should increase to rd = 0.0921, with a risk premium of θ = 0.01. With this
increase, domestic agents adjust their portfolio choices accordingly and hence
allocate wd = 0.3863 of their wealth to their own assets. The resulting change
in the capital accounts are: M KAd = 0.0683 and M KAf = −0.0683, which are
again lower than the values in the previous chapter.
6.4 Growth Rate Rises by Half
When the coefficient of relative risk aversion can change symmetrically de-
pending on the growth rate deviations, when the growth rate is realized at 0.8%
instead of .4%, γ becomes -5.1. Then the coefficient of risk aversion decreases
to φf = 4.67. Keeping the mean and variance of returns constant, this causes
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foreigners to increase the weight of domestic asset in their portfolio by short-
selling their own assets : ωf∗ = −0.25, ω∗d = 1.25. The the total demand for
domestic assets thus increases and the change in the capital accounts are given
as: M KAd = 0.6232 and M KAf = −0.6232, which improves the capital account
of the domestic country to a great extent.
6.5 Domestics Providing Lower Premium
Following from the previous case, suppose the domestic agents decides to lower
their premium so that the foreigners continue holding the same portion of their
wealth on the domestic asset, i.e., ω∗d = 0.6268. Keeping everything else constant,
the return on the domestic asset should decrease to rd = 0.062, so the risk
premium should fall by 0.02. With this change in the domestic returns, domestic
agents adjust their portfolio choices accordingly and hence allocate wd = 0.18 of
their wealth to their own assets. The resulting change in the capital accounts
are: M KAd = −0.138 and M KAf = 0.138, which worsens the external balance
of the domestic country. The results of this chapter is summarized at Table- 6.
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Initial Case-I Case-II Case-III Case-IV Case-V
Case
rd = 0.0821 rd = 0.04105 rd = 0.0821 rd = 0.0921 rd = 0.0821 rd = 0.062
rf = 0.0437 rf = 0.0437 rf = 0.0437 rf = 0.0437 rf = 0.0437 rf = 0.0437
σ2d = 0.0065 σ
2
d = 0.0065 σ
2
d = 0.0065 σ
2
d = 0.0065 σ
2
d = 0.0065 σ
2
d = 0.0065
σ2f = 0.000377 σ
2
f = 0.000377 σ
2
f = 0.000377 σ
2
f = 0.000377 σ
2
f = 0.000377 σ
2
f = 0.000377
γ = 0 γ = 0 γ = 2.55 γ = 2.55 γ = −5.1 γ = −5.1
φd 21.23 21.23 21.23 21.23 21.23 21.23
φf 9.77 9.77 12.32 12.32 4.67 4.67
ωd 0.318 0.0368 0.318 0.3863 0.318 0.18
ω∗d 0.6268 0.015 0.508 0.6268 1.25 0.6268
ωf 0.682 0.963 0.682 0.6137 0.682 0.82
ω∗f 0.3737 0.985 0.492 0.3737 -0.25 0.3737
M
KAd 0 -0.892 -0.1183 0.0683 0.6232 -0.138
M
KAf 0 0.892 0.1183 -0.0683 -0.6232 0.138
Table 6: Results Summary- The values in the initial case come directly from data.
Case-I, II and III follow from the previous chapter with the only difference being δ. Case-IV
is when the growth rate in the foreign country is realized twice as much of the expectation,
and hence foreigners become less risk averse, short-selling their foreign assets and invest
in the domestic asset, which improves the capital account of the domestic country as the
total demand for the domestic assets rise. In Case-V, when the foreigners become more
less averse, domestic agents offer a lower risk premium which allows the foreigners to keep
the same portion of their wealth in the domestic asset, which decreases the total demand
for the domestic asset since the return is lower and hence worsens the capital account of
the domestic country.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this study, the role of endogenously changing risk aversion in the portfolio
decisions of the countries in a heterogeneous agents setting is investigated. With
the simplified model, using data for the US and the developing countries, it is
shown that the US investors have a higher coefficient of risk aversion compared
to a developing county resident on average. The relationship between changes
in growth rate and the coefficient of risk aversion of the foreign country is esti-
mated and it is found that as the growth rate is realized lower than the expected
level, foreigners turn more risk averse and hence lower their demand for the risky
domestic assets or require higher risk premium in order to keep their previous
portfolio allocations. As a robustness check, the asymmetry in the deviations of
the growth rate for the preference parameter is assumed away and hence foreign
investors not only become more risk averse when the growth rate is realized at
a lower rate than the expected, but they also become less risk averse when the
growth rate is realized at a higher level compared to the expected growth rate.
When the preference parameter γ is allowed to respond symmetrically to the
growth deviations, an increase in the growth rate results in foreigners allocating
more of their wealth in the risky domestic asset. Alternatively, they can also
continue holding the same portion of their wealth in the risky domestic asset
when the domestic returns fall, as less risk averse foreigners require a lower pre-
mium for the risky domestic assets. These exercises show that the risk aversion
of the investors responds to changes in growth rate and hence agents revise their
portfolio allocations accordingly. Thus, demand for assets of a country is affected
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not only by the factors endogenous to that country which affect the riskiness or
yields of the assets of that country directly, but also by factors exogenous to the
country in consideration and yet affects the demand for their assets, such as a
change in the risk aversion of the foreign investors caused by the changes in the
fundamentals of the foreign country. The general model in Chapter-4 will pro-
vide a better insight to this topic; however it is left for future work due to time
constraints.
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